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THE OTHER SIDE OF THE RABBIT HOLE: RECONCILING
RECENT SUPREME COURT PERSONAL JURISDICTION
JURISPRUDENCE WITH JURISDICTION TO TERMINATE
PARENTAL RIGHTS
by
*
Joan M. Shaughnessy
This Essay contrasts the jurisdictional regime followed in termination of
parental rights and other child custody cases with the regime that has
dominated recent Supreme Court personal jurisdiction cases. Jurisdiction
in child custody cases has long been based upon the connection of the
child, not the defendant parent, to the jurisdiction. Recent Supreme
Court cases, on the other hand, have focused nearly exclusively on the defendant’s connection to the forum state. This Essay argues that the Supreme Court cases betray a failure of the Court to provide a consistent
constitutional justification for the jurisdictional limitations it has imposed. The Essay suggests that the regime followed in child custody cases
can be reconciled with the various justifications that the Court has offered for limiting the scope of personal jurisdiction and further suggests
that the child custody jurisdictional regime provides a useful example of
a constitutionally permissible jurisdictional regime based upon the interest of the forum state in resolving the dispute and the connection of the
litigation to the forum state.
“If you’re reading this tribute, chances are that you, too, are a
jurisdiction junkie at some level. If you’re a Civil Procedure person like me, the attachment to jurisdiction (no pun intended)
seems obvious and natural. But the same can be said for the
faithful followers of Family Law, who inhabit their own world of
jurisdictional madness on the other side of the rabbit hole.”1

*
Roger D. Groot Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of
Law. My thanks are owed to John Parry and the Lewis & Clark Law Review for the
invitation to participate in this symposium. I also owe a debt of gratitude to the
students in Civil Procedure over the years whose work on the Grey memorandum
assignment helped me to think through this argument. Finally, so many fine scholars
have written in this area, I regret that space permits me to acknowledge only a
handful of the many articles that have advanced scholarship in the field.
1
Steven S. Gensler, A Tribute to Robert Spector: “It Started With Jurisdiction,” 63
Okla. L. Rev. v, v (2011). Professor Robert Spector is the Reporter for the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA, discussed below) for the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Id. at vi.
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In recent decades the Supreme Court has handed down dozens of
opinions attempting to define the limitations imposed by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution on the exercise of judicial jurisdiction. The Court’s
jurisprudence has suffered from an inability of the Justices to agree on
2
the fundamental rationale for the limitations it has imposed. At times,
the Court has invoked federalism as a rationale, seeing the limitations on
jurisdiction as a function of the limitations on the sovereign power of the
3
states. The Court has also sometimes suggested that its limitations are, in
4
part, based upon concerns about international comity and rapport. In
other opinions, the Court has rejected the sovereignty rationale in favor
of a focus on the fairness of forcing an unwilling litigant to defend in an
inconvenient forum—in effect, offering a procedural due process ra5
tionale for its jurisdictional limitations. In recent years, the Supreme
Court has increasingly insisted that its personal jurisdiction jurisprudence
is intended to protect defendants by requiring a substantial connection
between the defendant and the forum state. As Justice Thomas observed
for a unanimous Court in Walden,
[T]he relationship must arise out of contacts that the “defendant
himself” creates with the forum State. Due process limits on the
State’s adjudicative authority principally protect the liberty of the
nonresident defendant—not the convenience of plaintiffs or
third parties. We have consistently rejected attempts to satisfy the
defendant-focused “minimum contacts” inquiry by demonstrating
contacts between the plaintiff (or third parties) and the forum
state.6
7

The plurality in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro was even more
explicit about the defendant-protective nature of the Court’s recent ju8
risprudence. In the plurality opinion in that case, Justice Kennedy
opined that “[t]he Due Process Clause protects an individual’s right to be
deprived of life, liberty, or property only by the exercise of lawful pow9
er.” In what might be characterized as a substantive due process rationale, the plurality opinion went on to assert that lawful power required
2

See Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction:
From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 19 (1990).
3
See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980);
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 249–50 (1958).
4
See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762–63 (2014).
5
See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472–74 (1985).
6
Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2014) (citations omitted). Justice
Thomas is not completely correct here, he overlooks the Court’s decision in Mullane
v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). See discussion infra note 46.
7
131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
8
Id. at 2785. For a critical analysis of Nicastro, see John T. Parry, Due Process,
Borders, and the Qualities of Sovereignty—Some Thoughts on J. McIntrye Machinery v.
Nicastro, 16 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 827 (2012).
9
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2786.
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10

that the defendant “submit to” a state’s authority. In Justice Kennedy’s
words,“[t]he question is whether a defendant has followed a course of
conduct directed at the society or economy existing within the jurisdiction of a given sovereign, so that the sovereign has the power to subject
11
the defendant to judgment concerning that conduct.”
In its recent jurisprudence, the Court has made no reference to a jurisdictional doctrine that has allowed state courts all over the country to
enter orders affecting defendants who have had no contact with the forum state. It is accepted practice in family law cases for state courts to enter orders concerning child custody and parental rights based upon the
presence of the child in the jurisdiction, even when one of the parents
12
affected by the order has never “submitted to the state’s authority.” This
accepted practice, which dates back many decades, is now codified in the
13
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA),
14
which has been adopted in forty-nine states. This well-established and
successful legislation provides a model for a different and more coherent
approach to structuring limitations on state court jurisdiction.
The main outlines of the Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence
are familiar and need be sketched only briefly. Pennoyer v. Neff was the
first Supreme Court case to tie limitations on state court exercises of personal jurisdiction to the then-new Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
15
Amendment. Interestingly, the Court did not derive the jurisdictional
limitations from the text or history of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Instead, the Pennoyer Court found the limitations in what it
described as “well-established principles of public law,” which it derived
16
primarily from international law treatises. Those principles, the Pennoyer
Court held, prevented a state court from exercising direct jurisdiction
over persons and property outside the state, but did permit a state to indirectly affect out-of-state persons and property through its exercise of
17
jurisdiction over in-state persons or property. The Court went on to observe that the newly enacted Due Process Clause provided a mechanism
for litigants to directly challenge and resist the enforcement of judg10

Id. at 2787–89.
Id. at 2789.
12
See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 79 (1971).
13
Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, 9(1A) U.L.A. 649
(1997) [hereinafter UCCJEA].
14
See The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Acts:
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Uniform Law Commission (2015),
http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Child+Custody+Jurisdiction+and+
Enforcement+Act for information concerning the adoption of the UCCJEA,
including an Enactment Status Map showing forty-nine states, plus the Virgin Islands
and the District of Columbia, have adopted the UCCJEA, and noting that a bill to do
so has been introduced in the Massachusetts legislature this year.
15
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878).
16
Id. at 722–23.
17
Id.
11
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ments entered in violation of the principles of public law laid out earlier
18
in the opinion.
The reasoning of Pennoyer has created problems ever since. Because
it grounded the limitations it imposed on state court jurisdiction not in
the text or purpose of the Due Process Clause, but rather in a distinct
body of public law, the Pennoyer Court paved the way for the doctrinal instability that persists to this day. The Court in Pennoyer did not discuss at
great length the rationale for the principles it identified but the rationale
it did offer was clearly grounded in concerns about infringements on
19
state sovereignty by sister states. Those concerns are not generally un20
derstood to be the concerns underlying the Due Process Clause.
The Pennoyer Court also seemed to recognize that its focus on jurisdiction based upon in-state presence or property was inadequate even
then to account for the jurisdictional landscape. Accordingly, the opinion concluded with a number of caveats, suggesting, for example, that a
state could condition certain in-state activities by non-residents on con21
sent to jurisdiction. Most significantly for our purposes, the Pennoyer
Court specifically addressed the power of a state court to enter judgment
determining the status of a non-resident at the behest of a resident plaintiff. “The jurisdiction which every State possesses to determine the civil
status and capacities of all its inhabitants involves authority to prescribe
the conditions on which proceedings affecting them may be commenced
22
and carried on within its territory.”
In the years following Pennoyer, the Court struggled to accommodate
its framework to a rapidly modernizing and expanding nation. Relying in
part on legal fictions extending the concept of in-state persons and property and the concept of consent, it approved the exercise of jurisdiction
in many cases involving interstate transactions and events. In International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, the Court took the opportunity to harmonize its
existing precedent, offering a new test for the scope of state courts’ in
23
personam jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations. The Court, in its
famous formulation, held that
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory
of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.”24

18

Id. at 733.
Id. at 720.
20
See Leonard G. Ratner, Procedural Due Process and Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: (a)
Effective-Litigation Values vs. The Territorial Imperative (b) The Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 363, 364–66 (1980).
21
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 735.
22
Id. at 734.
23
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
24
Id.
19
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The Court in International Shoe was focused on justifying the expansion of jurisdiction in the decades following Pennoyer. The Court therefore concentrated on its justification for permitting the exercise of jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants, and did not offer much explanation
for its statement later in the opinion that “[the Due Process C]lause does
not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam
against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no
25
contacts, ties, or relations.”
Support can be found in the opinion for various theories, which
26
were developed in the decades following International Shoe. For example,
support can be found in the Court’s reference to “the context of our fed27
eral system of government,” for the proposition that the limits on juris28
diction are premised on federalism concerns. Hanson v. Denkla and
World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson both relied in part on this proposition
in prohibiting the exercise of jurisdiction even in cases where the defendant could show no inconvenience and the forum state had a strong
29
interest in the litigation. Later opinions, particularly Insurance Corp. of
Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, reject the federalism argu30
ment. As the Court in Compagnie des Bauxites observed,
The restriction on state sovereign power described in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp., however, must be seen as ultimately a function of
the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process
Clause. That Clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction
requirement and the Clause itself makes no mention of federalism concerns.31
Even setting aside the federalism justification, there remains debate
within the Court about the justification for the limitations on jurisdiction.
International Shoe’s reference to “fair play” and later to the “inconveniences” of litigating away from home suggests that the justification for jurisdictional limits is the same as other procedural due process limits on

25

Id. at 319.
Of course, the theories are not mutually exclusive and some scholars have
argued that a combination of different rationales explain the Court’s jurisprudence.
See, e.g., Stephen Goldstein, Federalism and Substantive Due Process: A Comparative and
Historical Perspective on International Shoe and Its Progeny, 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 965
passim (1995); Parry, supra note 8, at 831–32.
27
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317.
28
See generally Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Three Deaths of “State Sovereignty” and the
Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 Notre Dame L. Rev.
699 (1983). For an argument that personal jurisdiction limitations should be
conceptualized as “a manifestation of horizontal federalism,” see Allan Erbsen,
Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 Emory L.J. 1, 7 (2010).
29
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980); Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
30
Ins. Corp. of Ir., v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
31
Id. at 702 n.10.
26
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32

procedures which unfairly burden litigants. Something of this view is reflected in Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court in Burger King Corp. v.
33
Rudzewicz and in his dissent in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson and
34
Rush v. Shavchuk. Pre-suit contacts with the forum can be understood,
on this reading, as serving a notice function by allowing the defendant to
35
plan in advance for the possibility of litigation in the forum. The procedural due process justification also informed the Court’s opinion in Asahi
Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, which relied on a multi-factor test to
reject California’s attempt to exercise jurisdiction over a claim for indemnification by a Taiwanese corporation against a Japanese corpora36
tion.
Another understanding of limitations the Court has imposed on the
exercise of jurisdiction is grounded, not in procedural due process, but
37
rather in substantive due process. That argument might be traced back
to International Shoe’s reference approving the exercise of jurisdiction
over defendants who had the “benefits and protection” of the forum
38
state, which in turn may give rise to the obligation to defend in that fo39
40
rum. There are echoes of that formulation in Walden, but even more
emphatically in the Nicastro plurality, with its emphasis on the need to
show that the defendant had voluntarily submitted to the power of the
41
sovereign.
The Court’s failure to provide a full justification for its jurisdictional
jurisprudence leads to disagreement among the Justices and to uncer42
tainty for litigants and lower courts. It also has permitted the Court to
avoid the necessity of explaining how its jurisdictional decisions fit within
the larger landscape of procedural and substantive due process law. If
limitations on jurisdiction are a matter of procedural due process, then
43
arguably the Mathews v. Eldridge test, with its cost-benefit balancing analysis, should be taken into account in assessing the permissibility of asser32

Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316–17.
Burger King Corp v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472–74 (1985).
34
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 299–300. Justice Brennan wrote a single
dissent from both World-Wide and Rush.
35
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
36
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113–16 (1987).
37
A number of scholars have characterized the Court’s limits on jurisdiction as
grounded in substantive due process. For a recent example, see Charles W. “Rocky”
Rhodes, Liberty, Substantive Due Process, and Personal Jurisdiction, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 567,
572 (2007). For an entertaining earlier discussion, see Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin,
Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62
Wash. L. Rev. 479 (1987).
38
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
39
See Wendy Collins Perdue, Personal Jurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box, 32 B.C. L.
Rev. 529, 539–40 (1991) for a discussion of this line of argument.
40
Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2014).
41
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2787–88 (2011).
42
See Erbsen, supra note 28, at 3.
43
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
33
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44

tions of jurisdiction. Similarly, if the limitations are a matter of substantive due process, the elaborate structure the Court has constructed, requiring different levels of justification for state intrusions into different
45
protected interests, should be relevant. Either way, the Court’s larger
due process jurisprudence suggests that the liberty interest of the defendant being protected by cases like Walden and Daimler is not absolute
but is subject to defeasance under certain circumstances. Nevertheless, in
most of the Court’s personal jurisdiction due process cases going back to
Hanson and including Walden and Daimler, it is hard to find any acknowledgment that the need for defendant’s “own affiliation with the state”
46
can be overcome for any reason.
The jurisdiction regime followed by family courts around the country, in termination of parental rights cases as well as other custody cases,
is completely different. The defendant’s affiliation with the state is nei47
ther necessary nor sufficient for jurisdiction. Instead, under the
UCCJEA, jurisdiction in the vast majority of cases is premised on a find48
ing that the forum state is the “home state” of the child. If the child
lacks a home state, jurisdiction will ordinarily be based upon a substantial

44

See Patrick J. Borchers, Jones v. Flowers: An Essay on a Unified Theory of
Procedural Due Process, 40 Creighton L. Rev. 343 (2007) for an elaboration of how the
Court’s personal jurisdiction cases could be harmonized with its general procedural
due process jurisprudence.
45
Rocky Rhodes discusses at length the various substantive due process tests that
might be used to determine when a state can overcome a defendant’s liberty interest.
See Rhodes, supra note 37, passim. Stephen Goldstein argues for a retreat from the
Court’s “maximalist substantive due process approach” in favor of a “minimalist
approach” in Goldstein, supra note 26, at 998.
46
There are a handful of exceptions. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank upheld the
exercise of jurisdiction over a group of trust beneficiaries, some of whom had no
connection with the forum state, holding that “the interest of each state in providing
means to close trusts that exist by the grace of its laws and are administered under the
supervision of its courts is so insistent and rooted in custom as to establish beyond
doubt the right of its courts to determine the interests of all claimants, resident or
nonresident, provided its procedure accords full opportunity to appear and be
heard.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). See also
Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (upholding state court jurisdiction
over absent plaintiff class members without minimum contacts, as long as procedural
due process protections were provided). The Court has also explicitly reserved
decision on whether the doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity can overcome the need
for minimum contacts, at least where defendant has property in the forum. See
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 n.37 (1977). Justice Black argued against such a
requirement in his Hanson dissent, Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 258–59 (1958),
and in his World-Wide/Rush dissent, Justice Brennan urged the abolition of the
defendant’s “unjustified veto power over certain very appropriate fora.” World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 312 (1980). John Parry places Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent in Nicastro in this category. See Parry, supra note 8, at 849.
47
UCCJEA, supra note 13, § 201(c) (“Physical presence of, or personal
jurisdiction over, a party or a child is not necessary or sufficient to make a childcustody determination.”)
48
Id. § 201(a)(1).
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connection of the child and at least one parental figure with the forum.
The UCCJEA also contains provisions permitting the action to be moved
50
to a state that has been determined to be a more convenient forum, and
provisions for the exercise of temporary emergency jurisdiction where
51
necessary to protect children present in the state.
Although the UCCJEA is relatively new, having been approved by the
52
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1997,
it has long been the case that jurisdiction over child custody matters
turned on the child’s connection to the forum state. The first Restatement
of Conflicts, published in 1934, took the position that the forum in which a
53
child was domiciled had jurisdiction to decide on custody. It also provided that a court had jurisdiction to order removal of a child from an
54
unfit custodian, as long as the child was present in the forum state.
Over time, state courts began to depart from the traditional rule, reflected in the first Restatement, that the forum of the child’s domicile had
55
exclusive jurisdiction to determine custody. Some states based jurisdiction on the presence of the child in the state, some on the court’s in personam jurisdiction over the parents, and some recognized the possibility
56
that all three bases of jurisdiction might be permissible. In an influential decision authored by Justice Traynor, the California Supreme Court
57
took the latter view, and the drafters of the second Restatement of Conflicts
eventually followed the California court’s lead, permitting the exercise of
jurisdiction based upon in personam jurisdiction over the parties to the
controversy, but not requiring it when the child was either domiciled or
58
present in the state.
Over the course of the twentieth century, as Americans became more
mobile and divorce became more common, the jurisdictional approaches
used by courts and reflected in the second Restatement of Conflicts came
under increasing criticism from family law scholars and other interested
59
observers. Estranged parents were taking their children across state
49

Id. § 201(a)(2) (subsection (a)(2) also requires that substantial evidence
concerning the child be available in the forum state).
50
Id. §§ 201(a)(3), 207.
51
Id. § 204.
52
Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (Nat’l Conf. of
Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws) (Proposed Official Draft 1997), http://www.
uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/child_custody_jurisdiction/uccjea_final_97.pdf.
53
Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws §§ 145–46 (1934).
54
Id. § 148.
55
For a survey of cases, see Sampsell v. Superior Court, 197 P.2d 739, 748–50 (Cal.
1948) and Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 79 reporter’s note (1971).
56
Sampsell, 197 P.2d at 748–50.
57
Id.
58
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 79 (1971).
59
See Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A
Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1207,
1210–16 (1969).
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lines, sometimes in defiance of an existing custody decree, in the hope of
60
receiving a more favorable ruling in a new state. The ability of a state
court to base custody jurisdiction on the in-state presence of the child,
combined with the traditional understanding that a custody decree was
subject to modification in the rendering court and in any other court
61
with jurisdiction, encouraged parental defiance of custody decrees. It
also risked frequent changes of child custody, which had come to be seen
62
as damaging to the children involved.
63
In 1968, following lengthy study, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform Child Cus64
tody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA). The Act was intended to centralize most
decisions related to custody in a single court that had access to relevant
evidence about the child and the family and to insure that the custody
65
court’s decisions were recognized and enforced in other states.
Like the UCCJEA, the UCCJA provided for jurisdiction in the child’s
home state, or in the state where the child and at least one parental fig66
ure has a substantial connection. Unlike the UCCJEA, the earlier Act
67
did not give priority to the home state forum. Both Acts also contained
provisions for emergency jurisdiction based on the presence of the child,
although they differed in the scope of that jurisdiction and both con68
tained an inconvenient forum provision. The UCCJA, like the UCCJEA,
provided for jurisdiction without the need for in personam jurisdiction
69
over the parties. Like the UCCJEA, the UCCJA was adopted by states
70
across the country.
The concerns which led to the drafting of the UCCJA also led to
congressional action. In 1980, Congress adopted the Parental Kidnap-

60

Id. at 1215–17; see Ratner, supra note 20, at 384.
See, e.g., New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947) (allowing
modification of Florida custody decree by a New York court after child was removed
to New York by father).
62
Bodenheimer, supra note 59, at 1208–09.
63
For a description of the process leading to the enactment of the UCCJA, see
Bodenheimer, supra note 59, at 1216–18 and Anne B. Goldstein, The Tragedy of the
Interstate Child: A Critical Reexamination of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and
the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 25 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 845, 847–51 (1992).
64
Bodenheimer, supra note 59, at 1207 n.1.
65
Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction Act § 1, 9(1A) U.L.A. 271 (1999).
66
Id. § 3(a)(1)–(2).
67
Id. § 3.
68
Id. § 3(a)(3)–(4).
69
Id. § 12. It should be noted that the UCCJEA provision for jurisdiction to make
child custody determinations, UCCJEA § 201, is described in the comment to the
section as providing for subject matter jurisdiction and that the Act provides that
personal jurisdiction over a party is not necessary. UCCJEA § 201(c). This
declaration, in and of itself, surely does not resolve the question of the UCCJEA’s
constitutionality under current Supreme Court doctrine.
70
See Goldstein, supra note 63, at 849.
61
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71

ping Prevention Act (hereinafter PKPA), which was intended, among
other things, to require courts in most circumstances, to recognize and
72
enforce one another’s custody decrees. PKPA was intended to complement the provisions of the UCCJA, and accordingly it conditioned the
requirement of recognition and enforcement on the custody decree having come from a court that had jurisdiction based upon the home state
of the child, or failing that, the other jurisdictional provisions recognized
73
in the UCCJA.
Although PKPA was intended to complement the UCCJA, there were
74
some differences between the two schemes. Experience had also revealed some problems with interpretation and implementation of the
75
UCCJA. A desire to correct the problems led to the adoption of the
76
UCCJEA.
Regardless of the changes which have occurred over the past several
decades, one theme has remained constant: Congress, state legislatures,
most state courts, and many scholars believe that courts can render custody decrees, including decrees terminating parental rights, based upon
the connection of the child, not the defendant parent, with the forum
state. Various explanations have been offered to justify this conclusion.
One argument sometimes advanced was that the presence of the defendant’s child in the forum state was itself a contact within the meaning
of International Shoe, which would justify jurisdiction over the defendant
in disputes involving the relationship between the child and the defend77
ant parent. In Kulko v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court rejected that
78
argument. It held that California could not constitutionally exercise ju79
risdiction over an out-of-state father in a child support action. The
Court held that any benefits the child received from California were not
attributable to her father, and that simply agreeing to the child’s resi-

71
Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611 §§ 6–10, 94
Stat. 3568 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
72
See id. § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3569–71 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A).
73
28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c) (2012).
74
Patricia M. Hoff, The ABC’s of the UCCJEA: Interstate Child-Custody Practice Under
the New Act, 32 Fam. L.Q. 267, 269–73 (1998).
75
Id.
76
Id.; Kelly Gaines Stoner, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction & Enforcement Act
(UCCJEA)—A Metamorphosis of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), 75
N.D. L. Rev. 301, 301–02 (1999).
77
See, e.g., Ann Bradford Stevens, Is Failure to Support a Minor Child in the State
Sufficient Contact with that State to Justify In Personam Jurisdiction?, 17 S. Ill. U. L.J. 491
(1993).
78
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 93–94 (1978).
79
Id. As a result of Kulko and the UCCJEA provisions, there are times when a
parent seeking child custody and child support will have to bring suit in two different
jurisdictions. In Kulko itself the plaintiff had sought both custody and support. The
defendant did not contest the California court’s jurisdiction to determine custody.
Kulko, 436 U.S. at 88.
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dence in California was not sufficient to establish minimum contacts. It
seems quite clear after Kulko that the jurisdiction courts exercise in custody and termination cases must be justified on some theory other than
the traditional minimum contacts approach first formulated in Interna81
tional Shoe and most recently employed by the Court in Walden.
It is often contended that custody decisions are status determina82
tions. Support can be found in Supreme Court case law for this proposition. Pennoyer itself, as mentioned above, alluded in dicta to a state’s power to determine the status of its citizens, giving as an example actions for
83
84
divorce. In Williams v. North Carolina, the Court, relying on the status
exception, held that Nevada had jurisdiction to enter a divorce on behalf
of a Nevada domiciliary, in the absence of any connection between the
85
defendant and the forum.
Three years later, the Court decided International Shoe, ushering in
the modern era of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. Since that time, it
has not directly addressed the status exception. In Shaffer v. Heitner, the
Court, in the course of rejecting the proposition that the presence of a
defendant’s property in the state was sufficient to permit jurisdiction,
opined that “all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated
according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its proge86
ny.” Taken at face value, this claim would suggest that the status exception was no longer constitutionally viable. However, with little explanation, the Shaffer Court stated in a footnote that “We do not suggest that
jurisdictional doctrines other than those discussed in text, such as the
particularized rules governing adjudications of status, are inconsistent
87
with the standard of fairness.”

80

Id. at 94–95.
But see Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.Y.J.P., 823 A.2d 817, 837 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2003) (finding absent parent had minimum contacts when she
requested that N.J. child welfare agency not return the child to her in Haiti, but keep
the child in its custody in New Jersey).
82
See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 79 (1971);
Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws §§ 54, 57 (1934); Brigitte M.
Bodenheimer & Janet Neeley-Kvarme, Jurisdiction over Child Custody and Adoption After
Shaffer and Kulko, 12 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 229, 239–241 (1979).
83
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734–735 (1898).
84
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 297–302 (1942). (“Each state as a
sovereign has a rightful and legitimate concern in the marital status of persons
domiciled within its borders.”). In the course of its discussion, the Court rejected the
proposition that divorce proceedings were proceedings in rem.
85
The Court later held that Williams did not permit a court to exercise
jurisdiction to enter judgments concerning property division or alimony based on
plaintiff’s status. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 418–19 (1957); Kreiger v.
Kreiger, 334 U.S. 555, 556–57 (1948); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 548–49 (1948).
These holdings led to the phenomenon of the divisible divorce.
86
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
87
Id. at 208 n.30 (citing Roger Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 Tex.
L. Rev. 657, 660–61 (1959)).
81
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In spite of the Shaffer footnote, there is some doubt that the status
exception justifies the jurisdictional provisions of the UCCJA and the
88
UCCJEA. First, because the Court has never been entirely clear about
the rationale for its insistence that jurisdiction requires the defendant’s
“own affiliation with the State,” it is not clear how the status exception
might be reconciled with the Court’s personal jurisdiction jurispru89
dence. It seems in some respects to hale back to the sovereignty ra90
tionale rejected in Compagnie des Bauxites and other recent cases.
Second, there is some disagreement about whether the status exception can and should be extended beyond the divorce context to determi91
nations of child custody and terminations of parental rights. They involve very different considerations and the absent defendant arguably has
more at stake in cases involving his relationship with his child than he
92
does in cases involving his relationship with an estranged spouse.
Another difficulty with relying on the status exception is the Su93
preme Court’s puzzling opinion in May v. Anderson. May involved a situation where a husband and wife had separated. The couple and their
three children had been domiciled in Wisconsin, but the wife and the
children left for Ohio following the separation. The husband remained
in Wisconsin and there obtained a decree granting him a divorce and
94
custody of the children. Sometime later, after the children overstayed a
visit with their mother in Ohio, the father sought a writ of habeas corpus
from the Ohio court ordering their return. The Ohio court, believing
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U. S. Constitution required it
95
to give effect to the Wisconsin decree, ruled for the father. The Supreme Court reversed in an opinion by Justice Burton, holding that,
without having in personam jurisdiction over the mother, Wisconsin could
not cut off her “immediate right to the care, custody, management and
88
It should also be noted that the provisions of the Uniform Acts, while they rely
on the forum state’s connection to the child as a basis for jurisdiction, differ from the
traditional status exception, found in the First Restatement, which referred to the
child’s domicile. See Barbara Atwood, Child Custody Jurisdiction and Territoriality, 52
Ohio St. L.J. 369, 376–84 (1991).
89
Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123 (2014).
90
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
91
Atwood, supra note 88, at 376–84 (rejecting the status-exception rationale for
the UCCJA in favor of a reliance on “territorial jurisdiction” premised on childcentered contacts with the forum); Russell M. Coombs, Interstate Child Custody:
Jurisdiction, Recognition, and Enforcement, 66 Minn. L. Rev. 711, 742–43 (1982); Rhonda
Wasserman, Parents, Partners, and Personal Jurisdiction, 1995 U. Ill. L. Rev. 813, 816–19
& n.15 (1995) (reviewing the scholarship on both sides of this debate).
92
Coombs, supra note 91, at 745–51.
93
May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
94
The Court stated that the lower court “gave weight” to the father’s contention
that the children were domiciled in Wisconsin at the time of the decree, but found it
unnecessary to determine that question. Id. at 534. The Court further noted that the
mother’s domicile was stipulated to be Ohio at the time of the decree. Id. at 534 n.7.
95
Id. at 529.
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96

companionship of her minor children.” Justice Burton’s opinion in May
cast doubt on the traditional approach to custody jurisdiction based up97
on the child’s domicile and was the subject of serious criticism. It
seemed to suggest that the entry of the custody decree by the Wisconsin
98
court violated May’s due process rights. Justice Frankfurter, in his concurrence, wrote separately to urge that the Court held only that Ohio was
not required under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to give effect to the
Wisconsin decree, but that it would not offend the Due Process Clause if
99
it chose to do so.
Although the status exception provides some support for the current
jurisdictional regime, the regime can be justified on other grounds,
which taken together should lead the Court to recognize that under certain circumstances, the need for a defendant’s own, voluntary affiliation
100
with the forum can properly be dispensed with.
First, to the extent that the foundation of the Court’s restrictions on
state court jurisdiction is procedural due process, the Act contains a
number of protections for out-of-state defendants and in many jurisdictions, additional procedural protections are furnished in certain categories of cases, such as terminations. The Act provides for notice to the de101
fendant parent and an opportunity to be heard. It also contains mechmechanisms that facilitate the long-distance participation of an absent
102
parent. It provides mechanisms for the testimony of out-of-state parties
and other witnesses to be taken in their home state, either by deposition
103
or through an evidentiary hearing. Finally, the Act contains a provision
permitting forum non conveniens dismissal when a court determines that
104
a court of another state is a more appropriate forum.

96

Id. at 533.
See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., May v. Anderson: Preamble to Family Law Chaos, 45
Va. L. Rev. 379 (1959). As his title suggests, Hazard didn’t pull any punches in his
critique. His conclusion begins, “May v. Anderson was decided on grounds
unnecessary under the facts presented, untenable in the precedents decided, and
uncomprehending of the consequences possibly to follow.” Id. at 406. See also Ratner,
supra note 20, at 382–85.
98
May, 345 U.S. at 537 (Jackson, J. dissenting).
99
May, 345 U.S. at 535–36 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The drafters of the
Uniform Acts concluded that Frankfurter’s opinion was the controlling opinion in
May because his vote was necessary to the majority. See Bodenheimer, supra note 59,
at 1232. For a criticism of this view, see Atwood, supra note 88, at 386.
100
I don’t mean to suggest that the UCCJEA regime is immune from
constitutional challenge. There may be circumstances where the exercise of
jurisdiction under the Act should be struck down. See infra notes 124–125 and
accompanying text. I am arguing that the UCCJEA’s general jurisdictional approach
should be upheld.
101
UCCJEA, supra note 13, § 106.
102
Id. § 111–12.
103
Id.
104
Id. § 207. See Ratner, supra note 20, at 385–90 (arguing that the UCCJA
satisfied procedural due process by implementing “effective-litigation values”).
97
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In some cases additional procedural protections may be available to
the parties. For example, parents may be entitled to appointed counsel in
abuse and neglect proceedings and in termination-of-parental-rights pro105
ceedings. Questions have been raised about the adequacy of the repre106
sentation provided in some jurisdictions, and representation of absent
defendants is likely to be particularly challenging. Nevertheless, in these
cases the states are providing a safeguard that the Supreme Court has
held not to be constitutionally required—a safeguard that has the potential to significantly reduce the burden on the most vulnerable out-of-state
107
defendants. In cases involving children who are citizens of foreign
countries, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations provides for
108
consular notification of the proceeding. Once notified, the consulate
can provide substantial assistance, for example in helping to locate the
absent parent, in gathering, translating and transmitting evidence from
abroad, and in helping caseworkers coordinate with their counterparts
109
overseas.
Next, the UCCJEA responds to the Court’s concern that “the States,
through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on
110
them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.” By its
111
112
terms, it provides for cooperation and communication between
courts in different fora which have a potential interest in the matter.
Moreover, the statute is an expression of the enacting state’s particularized interest in exercising jurisdiction in these cases and the Court has
from time to time suggested that such targeted expressions of interest are
113
entitled to weight in the assessment of constitutionality. Even more significant to the territoriality analysis, the adoption of the UCCJEA in fortynine states represents a consensus expression of the states’ understanding of their shared responsibility for fairly adjudicating the custody of the
114
“interstate child.” It is difficult to see how the exercise of jurisdiction
105
Astra Outley, Representation for Children and Parents in Dependency
Proceedings 7 (Pew Charitable Trs. 2004), http://www.law.yale.edu/rcw/rcw/
jurisdictions/am_n/usa/united_states/us_pew_report.pdf.
106
Id. at 7–9.
107
Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24, 26–27 (1981).
108
Multilateral Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol
on Disputes art. 37(b), Apr. 24, 1964, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
109
See Ann Laquer Estin, Global Child Welfare: The Challenges for Family Law, 63
Okla. L. Rev. 691, 701 (2011); Robert G. Spector, The Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations: The Most Neglected Provision of International Family Law, 22 Transnat’l L. &
Contemp. Probs. 643, 650 (2013).
110
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
111
UCCJEA, supra note 13, §§ 111, 112, 306.
112
Id. §§ 204, 206, 207, 307.
113
Kulko v. Superior. Court., 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 216 (1977); Carol S. Bruch, Statutory Reform of Constitutional Doctrine, 28 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 1047, 1052–53 (1995).
114
This term is Albert Ehrenzweig’s. See Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Interstate Child
and Uniform Legislation: A Plea for Extralitigious Proceedings, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1965).
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under the UCCJEA by the courts of one state could be seen to infringe
on the sovereignty of a sister state when that state had agreed to the “infringement” in adopting the legislation that deprived its courts of jurisdiction.
It is also worth noting that the jurisdictional approach of the
UCCJEA is mirrored in the federal legislation, the PKPA, governing the
circumstances under which custody decrees are entitled to full faith and
115
credit. That statute shares the UCCJEA’s focus on concentrating childcustody jurisdiction in the child’s “home state,” whether or not the de116
fendant parent has significant connections with the state. Congress, of
course, enjoys constitutional authority to legislate with respect to the effect of state court judgments, and hence its action should be entitled to
some weight in the consideration of whether the exercise of UCCJEA jurisdiction is constitutional.
The Court has also expressed comity concerns, from time to time, in
117
cases involving jurisdiction over foreign nationals. The UCCJEA takes
into account these concerns. It provides for enforcement of foreign decrees made under circumstances in conformity with the standards of the
Act and it requires that courts defer to the jurisdiction of foreign states
with closer ties to the child, just as they must defer to courts of sister
118
states.
The third justification for the Court’s restrictions is the substantive
due process justification. On this understanding, the defendant’s right to
be free from the jurisdiction of a state with which he has not voluntarily
affiliated is a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although the cases are not very clear, they can be read to suggest that
this liberty interest may be separate and apart from any liberty or proper119
ty interest that the defendant has in the object of the litigation. If this is
indeed a proper understanding, the question then becomes what level of
justification, if any, can overcome the defendant’s interest. If the right is

115
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611 § 8(a), 94
Stat. 3569–71 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A).
116
Id.
117
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762–63 (2014); Asahi Metal Indus. Co.
v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115–16 (187).
118
UCCJEA, supra note 13, § 105. See D. Marianne Blair, International Application
of the UCCJEA: Scrutinizing the Escape Clause, 38 Fam. L.Q. 547, 547 (2004). The Act also
attempts to harmonize state law in this area with the United States’ obligations under
various international instruments, including the Convention on the Civil Aspects of
Child Abduction. Id. at 548. The Convention has been controversial and the rich
literature of that controversy is beyond the scope of this paper. It is fair to observe,
however, that the Court might not be in the best position to dictate what comity
demands in the area of international child custody determinations.
119
The parent’s interest in the object of the litigation—his or her relationship
with her child—is a fundamental right, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753–59
(1982), but the parent’s interest in avoiding the jurisdiction of a particular state’s
courts may not be. See infra notes 120–121 and accompanying text.
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120

fundamental, strict scrutiny would normally apply. If not, a rational ba121
sis for state intrusion should be adequate justification.
In the context of child-abuse and neglect cases and termination-ofparental-rights cases, the need for courts with jurisdiction over the child
to be able to proceed, even when a parent is absent from the state, is
compelling. In many circumstances, the cases involve children in the custody of child welfare agencies. Whether the children have been allowed
to remain at home or removed to foster care, the agency, with court oversight, will spend months or more working to permit the return of the
children to the parent’s custody or, failing that, to bring the case to com122
pletion through a termination proceeding. The need for ongoing court
oversight and the involvement of public agencies as parties to the proceeding make the possibility of litigating these cases in more than one
jurisdiction practically impossible. Of course, if traditional minimum
contacts were required, a court overseeing a case involving an in-state
parent and an out-of-state parent could exercise jurisdiction to terminate
the rights of the in-state parent but decline to act as to the absent parent.
In that case, however, the child would be left in limbo, with no legal relationship with the parent who was likely most involved with the child before the termination but without the ability to be adopted because of the
court’s inability to terminate the rights of the absent parent. The need to
avoid that outcome is surely a compelling state interest. Several state
courts have addressed the constitutionality of the exercise of jurisdiction
to terminate the parental rights of an absent parent and for the most part
123
they have concluded that the exercise of jurisdiction was permissible.

120

Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 792–
94 (3d ed. 2006).
121
Id. John Parry points out that “the Court has never indicated that personal
jurisdiction implicates a fundamental right,” and suggests that rational basis is the
correct standard to apply to the substantive due process analysis in personal
jurisdiction cases. Parry, supra note 8, at 853. Parry, it should be noted, believes that
procedural due process and federalism also play a role in the Court’s decisions
limiting the jurisdiction of state courts. Id. at 853 n.123.
122
For a brief overview of the process, see Child Welfare Info. Gateway,
Understanding Child Welfare and the Courts (2011), https://www.
childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/cwandcourts.pdf.
123
See, e.g., J.D. v. Tuscaloosa Dep’t of Human Res., 923 So.2d 303, 308 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2005); In re Appeal in Maricopa Cty. Juvenile Action No. JS-734, 543 P.2d 454,
460 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975); In re Interest of M.L.K., 768 P.2d 316, 319 (Kan. App.
1989); Wenz v. Schwartze, 598 P.2d 1086, 1092 (Mont. 1979); Div. of Youth and
Family Servs. v. M.Y.J.P., 823 A.2d 817, 836–38 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003)
(requiring minimum contacts in termination but finding them in mother’s
acquiescence to N.J. child welfare agency’s custody of child); Graham v. Copeland (In
re Adoption of Copeland), 43 S.W.3d 483, 487 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); In re M.S.B. 611
S.W.2d 704, 706 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); State ex rel. W.A. v. State, 63 P.3d 607, 611
(Utah 2002); In re R.W., 39 A.3d 682, 700 (Vt. 2011); In re Thomas J.R., 663 N.W.2d
734, 736 (Wis. 2003). But see In re Doe, 926 P.2d 1290, 1292, 1295 (Haw. 1996); In re
Vernon R.V., 991 P.2d 986, 986 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999).
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I don’t mean to suggest that the UCCJEA jurisdictional regime resolves all due process and sovereignty concerns successfully, as written or
as applied. Arguments could be made that the procedural protections afforded absent parents are not sufficient and that additional efforts
124
should be required to allow full participation by those defendants. It
might also be argued that, at least in cases pitting two parents against
each other, more consideration should be given to dismissing in favor of
the courts of the residence of the defendant parent, in cases where the
child’s interest can be protected and evidence made available in that fo125
rum. Similarly, although the UCCJEA does take into account the interest of foreign states and of foreign parents, it may be that, as the international law of custody evolves, Congress, the drafters of the UCCJEA, and
the state legislatures will need to reexamine how United States jurisdic126
tion law can best be harmonized with international law. However, even
in light of these concerns, on balance the UCCJEA regime has been successful and should be permitted to continue, with adjustments as needed.
The UCCJEA, particularly in its application to termination of parental rights cases, provides a counter-example to prevailing jurisdictional
doctrine. It represents a vigorous assertion of the interests of the states in
a jurisdictional regime that provides for exclusive jurisdiction over all
parties in a termination case in a single jurisdiction. The basis for jurisdiction is the connection of the forum with the child whose interests are
the central concern of the litigation, not the connection of the defendant
with the forum. The justification for the jurisdictional regime is found in
the forum’s compelling need to protect children subject to its jurisdiction and to the degree possible to provide them with a stable and permanent home. The UCCJEA represents an example of a constitutional regime of jurisdiction that once seemed to be within reach—a regime
focused on the interest of the state in resolving the dispute and the con127
nection of the litigation to the forum. As some of the other contribu-

124

See, e.g., In re R.W., 39 A.3d at 700–04 (Dooley, J., concurring) (discussing the
trial court’s failure to protect the absent father’s right to participate and suggesting
additional protections that should be afforded on remand).
125
See Wasserman, supra note 91, at 867–92, 891.
126
See Estin, supra note 109, at 715–22 and Robert G. Spector, Memorandum:
Accommodating the UCCJEA and the 1996 Hague Convention, 63 Okla. L. Rev. 615 (2011)
for a discussion of recent efforts to coordinate with the Hague Child Protection
Convention. As the UCCJA, the UCCJEA, and related international conventions have
evolved over time, concerns about their impact on domestic violence victims and
their children have been expressed and to some extent addressed, although concerns
remain that the issues have not been fully resolved. See, e.g., Carol S. Bruch, The Unmet
Needs of Domestic Violence Victims and Their Children in Hague Child Abduction Convention
Cases, 38 Fam. L.Q. 529 (2004); Joan Zorza, The UCCJEA: What Is It and How Does It
Affect Battered Women in Child-Custody Disputes, 27 Fordham Urb. L.J. 909 (2000).
127
See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950);
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev.
241, 281–82; Traynor, supra note 87, at 660–61; Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T.
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tors to this symposium have persuasively argued, it may be time for the
128
Court to reconsider the desirability of that regime.

Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1121, 1126
(1966).
128
See, e.g., Stanley E. Cox, Personal Jurisdiction for Alleged Intentional or Negligent
Effects, Matched to Forum Regulatory Interest, 19 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 725 (2015) and
John T. Parry, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction After Bauman and Walden, 19 Lewis &
Clark L. Rev. 607 (2015) (both arguing that a forum’s regulatory interest should
presumptively support jurisdiction); Cassandra Burke Robertson and Charles W.
“Rocky” Rhodes, A Shifting Equilibrium: Personal Jurisdiction, Transnational Litigation,
and the Problem of Nonparties, 19 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 643, 671(2015) (discussing the
need for input from the political branches in formulating court access doctrine).

